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Abstract 
I analyze optimal monetary policy in an economy with search and matching frictions in the 
labor market and staggered nominal wage and price contracts. In this framework, as opposed 
to the standard New Keynesian model, preset nominal wages need not have any effect on 
existing employment relationships. However, staggered bargaining of nominal wages distorts 
aggregate job creation and creates inefficient dispersion in hiring rates across firms. 
Targeting zero inflation (the optimal policy in the standard New Keynesian model) only 
magnifies these distortions. The optimal policy allows for non-zero inflation in response to 
real shocks, so as to reduce the rigidity of real wages. Quantitatively, the case against price 
stability as the sole goal of monetary policy turns out to be important. 
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1 Introduction
The search and matching paradigm has become a powerful tool for the analysis of
unemployment and the labor market.1 It is able to accommodate a wide range of
labor market policies and analyze their long-run e¤ect on unemployment and wages.2
When incorporated into otherwise standard real business cycle (RBC) models, it has
been shown to improve signicantly their empirical performance.3 More importantly,
it allows to analyze the cyclical behaviour of unemployment, vacancies and job ows,
important phenomena which general equilibrium models based on Walrasian labor
markets are not designed to address.
Parallel to this literature, the New Keynesian model has emerged as the standard
model of the monetary transmission mechanism. In its simplest version, the New
Keynesian model incorporates monopolistic competition and staggered price setting
into the standard RBCmodel.4 Because it is based on optimizing behaviour, it allows
for rigorous welfare analysis of alternative monetary policy rules. This, together with
its simplicity and empirical success, has allowed the model to become the workhorse
for the analysis of optimal monetary policy.5 However, it has inherited the RBC
models inability to say anything about unemployment and other key labor market
variables. This has led some researchers to introduce search and matching frictions
into the New Keynesian model, with a view to improving its descriptive power.6 Most
notably, these hybrid models allow to study the joint dynamics of unemployment and
ination, i.e. the Phillips curve.
However, up to date almost no work has been done in analyzing optimal monetary
policy in a New Keynesian framework with search and matching frictions.7 This
1The search and matching framework was developed by Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982) and
Pissarides (1985). For a simple exposition, see Pissarides (2000, Ch. 1).
2See e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides (2003).
3See Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Den Haan et al. (2000) and Hairault (2002) and Gertler
and Trigari (2006).
4The New Keynesian model was developed by the work of Kimball (1995) and Yun (1996),
building on Calvos (1983) mechanism of staggered price setting.
5See King and Wolman (1999), Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) for extensive analyses
of monetary policy in New Keynesian models. See Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone (2001) and
Gali et al. (2001) for assessments of the models ability of explain ination dynamics in the US and
other industrialized economies.
6See Cheron and Langot (2000), Walsh (2003, 2005), Trigari (2003,2005), Moyen and Sahuc
(2005), Christo¤el and Linzert (2005), Blanchard and Gali (2006) and Domenech et al. (2006).
Cooley and Quadrini (1999) consider a limited participation model of money, rather than staggered
prices.
7The only exception that I am aware of is the independent work by Blanchard and Gali (2006).
The di¤erences between both papers are explained below in this section.
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paper is an attempt to ll this gap. In addition to staggered price setting by rms, I
also incorporate staggered bargaining of nominal wages between rms and workers.8
Since staggering of nominal wages is an established fact of virtually all industrialized
economies, it makes little sense to analyze monetary policy in a model with staggered
prices only.9
Search frictions introduce an explicit distinction between the two margins of la-
bor, because adjusting the extensive margin is costly and time-consuming. E¢ ciency
in this framework therefore requires stabilizing both employment (equivalently, un-
employment) and hours per employee around their e¢ cient paths. In addition, dis-
persion in relative prices or wages across rms must be avoided.
My rst result concerns the benchmark case in which all wages are Nash-bargained
in every period. In this case, I show that, provided the economys steady state is
e¢ cient, the central bank can replicate the e¢ cient equilibrium by keeping the price
level constant. This way, it can eliminate the distortionary e¤ects of price stickiness,
because those rms that cannot reset prices would not want to change them anyway.
The empirically relevant case however is the one in which only a fraction of
rms renegotiate nominal wages. Staggered bargaining of nominal wages creates two
types of distortion. First, the stickiness of nominal wages leads to real wage rigidity
in response to real shocks; since rmsincentives to post vacancies depend on the real
wages to be paid to the new workers, aggregate job creation is ine¢ cient. Second,
the failure of some nominal wages to adjust leads to wage dispersion, which in turn
leads to ine¢ cient dispersion in hiring rates across rms. Targeting zero ination
only magnies these distortions. The optimal policy commitment therefore implies
temporary deviations from zero ination in response to real shocks. The central
bank uses price ination so as to accelerate the converge of actual real wages towards
their exible-wage (Nash) counterparts. This allows the central bank to reduce the
distortions arising from nominal wage stickiness. First, there is less ine¢ ciency in
aggregate job creation and therefore in the unemployment path.10 Second, if real
wages are closer to their exible-wage counterparts, renegotiating rms will change
their nominal wages by a smaller amount, thus reducing wage dispersion and the
subsequent dispersion in hiring rates. I show that, for a reasonable calibration of
the model, the welfare loss incurred by society under the zero ination policy is
8Gertler and Trigari (2006) have introduced staggered bargaining of real wages in a real business
cycle framework with search and matching frictions, with the purpose of reconciling the smooth
behaviour of real wages with the high volatility of labor market activity in the US.
9For evidence on staggering of nominal wages in the US and other industrialized economies, see
Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
10I assume exogenous job destruction, such that changes in unemployment are due to changes in
job creation only.
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approximately twice as large as under the optimal commitment.
The suboptimality of the zero ination policy in this framework contrasts with the
policy recommendation of the standard NewKeynesian model. In the latter, provided
the steady state is e¢ cient (or nearly e¢ cient), the optimal policy commitment
consists precisely of keeping the price level constant, not just in the long run but also
in response to the kinds of real shocks (to technology, preferences and government
expenditure) that are thought to be the main sources of business cycle uctuations.11
This policy prescription has been called the case for price stability.12
In this respect, an important predecessor to my paper is the work of Erceg, Hen-
derson and Levin (2000). In direct analogy with the mechanism for staggered price
setting in goods markets, these authors assume that households are monopolistic
suppliers of labor who set their own wages at random intervals, and then let rms
decide how much labor they want to buy. They show that wage staggering distorts
aggregate labor allocations and creates ine¢ cient dispersion in labor requirements
across rms. As a consequence, zero ination is not optimal, for reasons that are
similar to those discussed above. However, as emphasized by Goodfriend and King
(2001), there is a fundamental asymmetry between labor markets, where most em-
ployment relationships are long-term, and goods markets, where spot transactions
prevail. But in a context of on-going employment relationships, sticky wage models
are subject to the well-known Barro (1977) critique: preset nominal wages should not
distort e¢ cient employment relationships, because both parties can always renego-
tiate the labor-wage package in a way that makes the two of them better o¤ relative
to the situation without renegotiation.
Search frictions serve a double purpose in my model. First, it motivates the
existence of on-going employment relationships, by creating a joint surplus for rm
and worker which is in their mutual interest to keep. Second, it allows me to analyze
the distortionary e¤ect of staggered nominal wages in a way that is free of Barros
critique. Search frictions create a bargaining set, i.e. a wedge between the rms
and the workers reservation wage. As emphasized by Hall (2005), even if the wage
cannot be changed, so long as it remains inside the bargaining set it will not lead
to ine¢ cient job loss. Barros critique also applies to the intensive margin of labor,
hours per employee. Again, I avoid imposing arbitrary distortions on employment
relationships by assuming that hours are determined in a privately e¢ cient way,
by maximizing the joint match surplus; this makes hours independent of the wage.
11See e.g. King and Wolman (1999) and Woodford (2003, section 6.3). Woodford (2003, sec-
tion 6.4) discusses reasons why price stability may not be optimal, including large steady-state
distortions.
12See e.g. Goodfriend and King (2001) and Woodford (2003, section 6.3).
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Therefore, preset nominal wages in my model do not a¤ect existing employment
relationships. However, they do a¤ect vacancy posting by rms and therefore the
rate at which employment relationships are formed. I conclude that my framework
provides a case against strict price stability while at the same time avoiding Barros
critique.
A second important di¤erence relative to Erceg et al. (2000) is the following. In
the Erceg et al. (2000) model, stabilizing the output gap (i.e. the gap between actual
and e¢ cient output) is equivalent to stabilizing a weighted average of price and wage
ination. Since the latter are quantitatively the main sources of distortion in that
model, it follows that closing the output gap is nearly optimal for any degree of price
and wage stickiness. In my model, conditional on the employment stock, stabilizing
output is equivalent to stabilizing hours per worker. The latter are distorted by price
stickiness, as well as by ine¢ cient vacancy posting (through the resource constraint),
but not by wage stickiness. If vacancy posting costs are small as a fraction of output,
then closing the output gap is approximately equivalent to eliminating ination. Not
surprisingly, my numerical results suggest that, for empirically plausible degrees of
wage stickiness, output gap targeting may not be a desirable policy either.
To my knowledge, the only paper that analyzes optimal monetary policy in a
New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions is the independent work
by Blanchard and Gali (2006). These authors present a simple integration of the
New Keynesian and the search and matching models where equilibrium dynamics
can be solved analytically. They also present an interesting comparison of the e¤ect
of alternative monetary policy rules on the US as opposed to the EU economy, where
average job nding and separation rates are lower and unemployment therefore is
more persistent. When wages are Nash bargained in every period and the economys
steady state is e¢ cient, zero ination is the optimal policy, as is the case here.
However, Blanchard and Gali depart from the exible-wage benchmark by assuming
the existence of a wage norm (i.e. a constant real wage), rather than by assuming
staggered nominal wage bargaining as I do here.13 They then consider wage rules
where the actual real wage is a weighted average of the Nash wage and the wage norm.
As emphasized by Gertler and Trigari (2006), an advantage of assuming staggered
wage contracts a la Calvo (1983) is that the parameter regulating wage stickiness (the
fraction of wages that remain constant each period) can be calibrated empirically,
contrary to an arbitrary partial adjustment coe¢ cient in a wage equation. More
importantly, I show that replacing staggered wages with a wage equation based on
a symmetric wage norm underestimates the extent to which the zero ination policy
13The wage norm was introduced by Hall (2005). It has been subsequently used by a number of
authors, including Krause and Lubik (2005) and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005).
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is suboptimal, because in the latter case there is no wage dispersion and therefore
no welfare loss resulting from dispersion in hiring rates.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 obtains the e¢ cient equilibrium in this economy. Section 4 shows how the
central bank can replicate the e¢ cient equilibrium when wages are Nash bargained in
every period. Section 5 introduces staggered bargaining of nominal wages. Section 6
casts the monetary policy problem in a linear-quadratic representation, which allows
an easier understanding of the central banks stabilization goals and trade-o¤s. The
model is then calibrated and simulated both under the zero ination policy and
the optimal commitment. The implications of targeting the output gap, as well as
replacing staggered wages with a wage norm, are discussed in section 7. Section 8
concludes.
2 The model
The following model is a general equilibrium extension of Pissarides(1985) model of
search and matching frictions in the labor market with exogenous job destruction. I
consider explicitly both margins of labor: employment and hours. The main structure
of the model is very similar to Andolfattos (1996) business cycle model. In addition,
I assume staggered price and wage setting in order to introduce a non-trivial role for
monetary policy.
In this economy, the presence of search frictions in the labor market prevents
some jobseekers from nding jobs and some vacant positions from being lled in
each period. When a rm nds a suitable job applicant, we say that a match has
been formed. The number of matches mt formed in period t is given by the following
matching function,
mt = m(vt; ut);
where vt is the total number of vacancies posted by rms and ut is the total number
of unemployed workers. Normalizing the labor force to 1, ut also represents the
unemployment rate. The function m is strictly increasing and strictly concave in
both arguments. Assuming constant returns to scale in the matching function,14 the
matching rate for unemployed workers, or job-nding rate, is given by
mt
ut
= m(
vt
ut
; 1)  p(t);
14See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) for empirical evidence of constant returns to scale in the
matching function for several industrialized economies.
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where t  vt=ut is an indicator of labor market tightness. The function p() is
increasing in : the tighter the labor market, the easier it is for unemployed workers
to nd jobs. Similarly, the matching rate for vacancies is given by
mt
vt
= m(1;
1
vt=ut
)  q(t):
The function q() is decreasing in : the higher the number of vacancies relative
to the stock of job-seekers, the more di¢ cult it is for rms to ll vacant positions.
Notice that p(t) = tq(t).
2.1 Households
In the presence of unemployment risk, we may observe di¤erences in consumption
levels between employed and unemployed consumers. However, under the assumption
of perfect insurance markets, consumption is equalized across consumers. This is
equivalent to assuming the existence of a large representative household, as in Merz
(1995). In this household, a fraction nt = 1  ut of its members are employed. The
remaining fraction ut search for jobs. All members pool their income so as to ensure
equal consumption across members.
Employed members separate from their jobs at the exogenous rate , whereas
unemployed members nd jobs at the rate p(t). Therefore, the households employ-
ment rate evolves according to the following law of motion,
nt+1 = (1  )nt + p(t)(1  nt): (1)
Equation (1) is the Beveridge curve, which describes the relationship between vacan-
cies and the unemployment rate.
At the start of period t, the household receives a nominal interest rate it 1 on its
holdings of one-period nominal bonds, Bt 1. I assume that it is directly controlled by
the central bank. Aggregate nominal prots from the rm sector, t, are reverted to
the representative household in a lump-summanner. In addition, the household owns
a xed endowment of physical capital, k, which is rented to rms at the perfectly
competitive real rate rt. Members employed at rm i 2 [0; 1] earn a nominal wage
Wit. Denoting by nit the number of workers in rm i, the total wage income of the
representative household is given by
R 1
0
nitWitdi. Wage income is pooled with the rest
of income sources and used to purchase bonds as well as units of the Dixit-Stiglitz
consumption basket,
ct 
Z 1
0
c
 1

jt dj
 
 1
;
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where  > 1 measures the elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods j 2
[0; 1]. Cost minimization implies that the nominal cost of consumption is given by
Ptct, where
Pt 
Z 1
0
P 1 jt dj
 1
1 
is the corresponding price index. Therefore, the households budget constraint is
given by
(1 + it 1)
Bt 1
Pt
+
Z 1
0
nit
Wit
Pt
di+ rtk +
t
Pt
 ct + Bt
Pt
: (2)
The household derives utility u(ct) from consumption, where u is strictly increasing
and concave. Employed members su¤er disutility v(ht) from working ht hours, where
v is strictly increasing and convex; they also incur a xed utility cost b, e.g. time spent
commuting to work. Therefore, the representative household chooses consumption
and bond holdings to solve15
H(nt; Bt 1) = max
ct;Bt
fu(ct)  nt [v(ht) + b] + EtH(nt+1; Bt)g;
subject to (1) and (2). The solution to this problem is given by the standard con-
sumption Euler equation,
u0(ct) = (1 + it)Et

Pt
Pt+1
u0(ct+1)

:
Therefore, the central bank can control aggregate consumption ct by means of its
interest rate policy. Finally, it is convenient at this point to nd the value enjoyed by
the household from the marginal job in rm i. Writing nt =
R 1
0
nitdi, I di¤erentiate
the households Bellman equation with respect to nit, subject again to (1) and (2),
obtaining
Hni(nt; Bt 1)  Hni;t = u0(ct)
Wit
Pt
 v(ht) b p(t)EtHn;t+1+(1 )EtHni;t+1; (3)
where EtHn;t+1 = Et
R 1
0
vit
vt
Hni;t+1di is the expected average marginal value in period
t+ 1 and vit
vt
is the probability of being matched to rm i. Therefore, the value that
the household enjoys from holding a job in rm i consists of the real wage (in terms
of marginal utility) net of labor disutility, plus the future value of the job conditional
on survival, (1   )EtHni;t+1, minus the value the individual would contribute to
the household if she searched for a job, p(t)EtHn;t+1.
15Notice that all Bellman equations in this paper depend also on the aggregate state of the
economy. For clarity of exposition, I will omit this dependence.
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2.2 Firms
I assume the existence of two types of rms: producers and retailers. Producers use
capital and labor to produce a homogenous intermediate good; hiring in this sector
is subject to search frictions. Retailers buy the intermediate good from producers,
transform it into di¤erentiated consumption goods and sell them for a price chosen
at random intervals. The two-sector assumption allows me to separate the hiring and
pricing decisions of rms, which is convenient for the following reason. In a context
of staggered price-setting, merging the hiring and pricing decisions would create
sources of strategic complementarity in price-setting analogous to those analyzed
by Woodford (2005) in his treatment of rm-specic capital investment. However,
considering such complementarities would blur the exposition of the policy trade-
o¤s created by search frictions and nominal rigidities, and would not a¤ect the main
qualitative results of the paper.
2.2.1 Producers
A measure-one continuum of producers produce a homogenous intermediate good
and sell it to retailers at the perfectly competitive real price 't. Each rm i hires
capital kit in a competitive market with rental price rt. The rm also employs
nit workers. Each worker provides hit hours of work and receives a real wage WitPt .
These inputs are transformed into output by means of a constant returns to scale
technology, yit = Atf(nithit; kit). At is an aggregate productivity shock, the log of
which follows an autoregressive process, lnAt  at = aat 1 + "at , where "at is an iid
shock. For simplicity, I assume that At is the only source of aggregate uncertainty
in the model. However, the main qualitative results of the paper would be unaltered
if I introduced other types of real disturbances, such as preference shocks or shocks
to government expenditure.
In every period, each rm loses a fraction  of its workers. To replace them,
it posts a number vit of vacancies. The cost of posting vacancies, in units of the
intermediate good, is given by the following hiring cost function,
hcit =

1 +  

vit
nit
1+ 
nit: (4)
Therefore,  measures the degree of convexity of hiring costs. By taking  to 0,
we can recover the linear specication of the standard search and matching model.
However, the case where  > 0 is empirically more plausible: using US corporate
sector data, Merz and Yashiv (2004) nd support for the convex specication in a
structural estimation of the search and matching model.
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Assuming that rms in this sector are su¢ ciently large, the fraction of vacancies
they ll in each period with certainty is given by the matching rate for vacancies,
q(t). New workers do not become productive until the next period.16 Therefore,
employment in rm i is given by the following law of motion,
nit+1 = (1  )nit + q(t)vit: (5)
Each producer solves the following problem,
J(nit) = max
kit;vit

't [Atf(nithit; kit)  hcit]  rtkit  
Wit
Pt
nit + Ett;t+1J(nit+1)

;
subject to (4) and (5). The term t;t+s  s u
0(ct+s)
u0(ct) is the stochastic discount factor
by which households value time-(t + s) state-contingent real payo¤s. The rst or-
der condition with respect to kit equalizes the marginal revenue product of capital
to its rental rate, 'tAtf2(nithit; kit) = rt. Given constant returns to scale in pro-
duction, it follows that the capital-labor ratio kit
nithit
is equalized across rms. This
implies that the marginal product of labor, mplit  Atf1(nithit; kit), is also equalized.
Constant returns to scale also implies that the production function can be written as
mpltnithit+mpktkit, wheremplt andmpkt denote the common values of the marginal
product of labor and capital, respectively. Using this and the rst order condition
for capital, I can write
J(nit) = max
vit

't [mpltnithit   hcit] 
Wit
Pt
nit + Ett;t+1J(nit+1)

;
subject again to (4) and (5). The rst order condition with respect to vacancies is
given by
'tz
 
it = q(t)Ett;t+1Jn(nit+1); (6)
where zit  vitnit is the vacancy rate. The value of the marginal worker for the rm is
given by
Jn(nit) = 't

mplthit +  

1 +  
z1+ it

  Wit
Pt
+ (1  )Ett;t+1Jn(nit+1); (7)
i.e. the workers marginal revenue product, plus saving on hiring costs from having
one more worker, minus the real wage plus the jobs continuation value. Combining
16This represents the time involved in nding and training new workers.
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(6) and (7), I can write the rms hiring decision as,
'tz
 
it
q(t)
= Ett;t+1
(
't+1

mplt+1hit+1 +  

1 +  
z1+ it+1

  Wit+1
Pt+1
+ (1  )'t+1z
 
it+1
q(t+1)
)
:
(8)
Hours per worker, hit, are determined by rm and worker in a privately e¢ cient
way, i.e. so as to maximize the joint surplus of their employment relationship. The
joint surplus is the sum of the rms surplus, equation (7), and the workers surplus
in terms of the consumption basket, equation (3) divided by u0(ct). The rst order
condition is given by
'tmplt =
v0(hit)
u0(ct)
; (9)
i.e. the marginal revenue product of labor is equal to the marginal disutility of
work measured in units of consumption. Because the marginal revenue product
is the same for all producers, equation (9) implies that hours are equalized across
producers, hit = ht for all i.
2.2.2 Retailers
There is a measure-one continuum of monopolistic retailers, each of them produc-
ing one di¤erentiated consumption good. Due to imperfect substitutability across
individual goods, each retailer faces the following demand curve for its product,
cdjt =

Pjt
Pt
 
ct: (10)
Producing cdjt units of good j requires the same amount of the intermediate input,
which is purchased from producers at the real price 't. Therefore, 't represents the
real marginal cost of production for retailers. I follow the Calvo (1983) model of
price setting: each period a randomly chosen fraction p of rms fail to reset their
price. Therefore, when a rm has the chance of changing its price, it solves
max
Pjt
Et
1X
s=0
spt;t+s

Pjt
Pt+s
  't+s

cdjt+s;
subject to (10). The optimal pricing decision is given by
Et
1X
s=0
spt;t+s

P t
Pt+s
  't+s

P t+sct+s = 0; (11)
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where P t is the common price chosen by all price-setters. Therefore, each price-
setting rm chooses a nominal price such that, for the expected duration of the price
contract, its relative price equals a constant mark-up   
 1 > 1 over real marginal
costs on average. Since price-setters are randomly chosen, the law of motion for the
price level is given by
P 1 t = pP
1 
t 1 + (1  p)(P t )1 : (12)
2.2.3 Equilibrium in the intermediate good market
Given constant returns to scale in production, I can express aggregate output asZ 1
0
Atf(nitht; kit)di =
Z 1
0
Atnithtf(1; ~kt)di = Atnthtf(1; ~kt)
= Atf(ntht; ntht~kt) = Atf(ntht; k);
where ~kt is the common capital-labor ratio and in the last equality I have used
the market clearing condition for capital,
R
kitdi =
R
nitht~ktdi = ntht~kt = k. In
equilibrium, total supply of the intermediate good net of hiring costs, Atf(ntht; k) R
hcitdi, must equal total demand by retailers,
R
cdjtdj. Using (4) and (10), this
condition can be written as
Atf(ntht; k) =
Z 1
0

1 +  

vit
nit
1+ 
nitdi+ ctt (13)
where t 
Z 1
0

Pjt
Pt
 
dj is a measure of price dispersion.
3 The e¢ cient equilibrium
Before analyzing wage determination in the decentralized economy, it is convenient to
nd the e¢ cient allocation, since it will be the benchmark relative to which monetary
policy outcomes will be evaluated. I assume that the search frictions in the labor
market are a technological constraint on the social planner, just like the production
function. Therefore, I want to characterize the constrained-e¢ cient equilibrium of
this economy. The social planners optimization problem is thus the following,
V (nt) = max
ct;ht;vt;nt+1
fu(ct)  nt [v(ht) + b] + EtV (nt+1)g;
12
subject to the law of motion of employment,
nt+1 = (1  )nt +m(vt; 1  nt);
and the aggregate resource constraint. Since the social planner avoids any ine¢ cient
dispersion in relative prices, the price dispersion term t in (13) becomes 1. The
same holds for vacancy rates. Therefore, the relevant resource constraint is given by
Atf(ntht; k) =

1 +  

vt
nt
1+ 
nt + ct:
Using the two constraints to substitute for ct and nt+1 in the Bellman equation, the
social planner is left with the choice of hours per worker, ht, and vacancies, vt. The
rst order condition with respect to hours is given by
mplt =
v0(ht)
u0(ct)
; (14)
where mplt = Atf1(ntht; k) is the marginal product of labor. Therefore, the social
planner equalizes the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure.
The rst order condition with respect to vacancies is given by
z t u
0(ct) = m1(vt; ut)EtVn(nt+1): (15)
That is, the social planner equalizes the social marginal cost and the social marginal
benet of matching workers to rms. The social value of the marginal worker is given
by
Vn(nt) = u
0(ct)

mpltht +  

1 +  
z1+ t

  v(ht)  b+ [1  m2(vt; ut)]EtVn(nt+1):
(16)
Assuming that the matching function has constant elasticities  and 1 , respectively,
I can write m1(vt; ut) = q(t) and m2(vt; ut) = (1  )p(t).17 Combining this with
equations (15) and (16), I obtain
z t
q(t)
= Ett;t+1
8<: 
h
mplt+1ht+1 +  

1+ 
z1+ t+1   v(ht+1)+bu0(ct+1)
i
+ [1    (1  )p(t+1)] z
 
t+1
q(t+1)
9=; : (17)
Equation (17) is the condition for socially e¢ cient job creation in this economy.
17This is indeed the case if I assume a Cobb-Douglas specication, as I do later on.
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4 Equilibrium with exible (Nash) wages
Following most of the search and matching literature, I assume that, when rms
reset nominal wages, they do so according to the Nash bargaining solution. That
is, rm and worker each receive a constant fraction of the match surplus. Letting
Sfit  Jn(nit) denote the rm surplus, I can write (7) as
Sfit = wit  
Wit
Pt
+ (1  )Ett;t+1Sfit+1; (18)
where
wit  't

mpltht +  

1 +  
z1+ it

: (19)
We can interpret wit as a limiting real wage that, if paid in every period, would make
the rm surplus equal to 0. Similarly, letting Swit  Hni;tu0(ct) denote the worker surplus
expressed in terms of the consumption basket, I can express (3) as
Swit =
Wit
Pt
  w
¯ t
+ (1  )Ett;t+1Swit+1; (20)
where
w
¯ t
 v(ht) + b
u0(ct)
+ p(t)Ett;t+1S
w
t+1 (21)
and Swt+1 is the average worker surplus across rms. wit is therefore a limiting real
wage that would make the worker surplus equal to 0 if it was paid in every period.
Let " 2 (0; 1) denote the rms bargaining power. Nash bargaining implies that
the rm receives a fraction " of match surplus, Sfit + S
w
it , that is,
(1  ")Sfit = "Swit : (22)
Combining (18), (20) and (22), the resulting real wage is just the weighted average
of the two limiting wages,
Wit
Pt
= (1  ") wit + "w¯ t  w
nash
it : (23)
If all wages are changed in every period, then all producers behave in exactly the same
way and I can drop the subscript i. On the other hand, using (22) and the rst order
condition for vacancies, equation (6), I can write Ett;t+1S
w
t+1 =
1 "
"
Ett;t+1S
f
t+1 =
14
1 "
"
'tz
 
t
q(t)
. This, together with the denitions of the limiting wages and the fact that
p(t) = tq(t), allows me to write the real wage as
Wt
Pt
= (1  ")'t

mpltht +  

1 +  
z1+ t + z
 
t t

+ "
v(ht) + b
u0(ct)
: (24)
Using (24) to substitute for the real wage in (8), I obtain
't
z t
q(t)
= Ett;t+1
8<: "
h
't+1

mplt+1ht+1 +  

1+ 
z1+ t+1

  v(ht+1)+b
u0(ct+1)
i
+ [1    (1  ")p(t+1)]'t+1 z
 
t+1
q(t+1)
9=; : (25)
Notice that period-by-period Nash bargaining per se does not guarantee that the
central bank can achieve the rst-best allocation, which requires equations (14) and
(17) to hold, as well as the absence of price dispersion (t = 1). First, by equation
(12), avoiding price dispersion requires keeping the price level constant. By equation
(11), this requires the central bank to ensure that the marginal cost equals the
inverse of the retailer gross mark-up in every period: 't = 
 1 < 1. But then, by
equation (9), hours per worker are ine¢ ciently low. In principle, the mark-up could
be eliminated by assuming that retailer sales are subsidized at the rate s, such that
the e¤ective mark-up is given by s  1+s , and then setting s =    1, such that
s = 1.
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However, even if the retailer mark-up is eliminated, imposing 't = 't+1 = 1 in
equation (25) is e¢ cient only if the rms share of the match surplus, ", is equal
to the elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies, . In this case,
rms internalize the congestions that they create in the labor market in a way that
leads them to post the e¢ cient number of vacancies. This is the well-known Hosios
condition for e¢ cient job creation (Hosios, 1990). Notice that the zero net mark-up
and the Hosios condition ensure that the steady state of this economy is e¢ cient.19
The central bank can then replicate the social planner allocation by choosing the
level of aggregate consumption ct consistent with 't = 1 in equation (9). If s = 1,
this also ensures that the price level is kept constant. To summarize,20
Proposition 1 If wages are Nash-bargained in every period, the central bank can
achieve the e¢ cient allocation if and only if the economys steady state is e¢ cient.
In this case, the e¢ cient allocation is achieved by keeping the price level constant.
18See e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
19Cyclical uctuations will generally be ine¢ cient as a result of nominal rigidities.
20The same result as the one in Proposition 1 has been found in independent work by Blanchard
and Gali (2006) in a similar framework.
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5 Equilibrium with staggered wages
Period-by-period renegotiation of wages is a convenient theoretical benchmark, but
is not empirically appealing. In reality, nominal wages remain unchanged for many
periods, and most wages are not changed more often than once a year (see e.g.
Gottschalk, 2004). In addition, there is plenty of evidence that wage changes across
rms are not synchronized, at least for the majority of industrialized economies.21 In
order to formalize the staggered nature of nominal wage adjustment, I assume that
in every period a randomly chosen fraction w of rms do not renegotiate wages with
their employees, in analogy with the Calvo model of price-setting.22 Therefore, w is
the probability that a rms nominal wage does not change in the following period.
I assume that workers hired in between contracting periods receive the same wage as
continuing workers. As found by Bewleys (1999) survey of business managers and
labor leaders in the US, equity considerations at the rm level often lead the wages
of new hires to be linked to the existing internal pay structure. Bewley observes
that this is especially true for the primary sector of the labor market, i.e. jobs that
are long-term and full-time, which is precisely the kind of employment relationships
considered in this model.
Let the superscript  (0) denote rms who do (do not) renegotiate, and let W it
be the agreed-upon nominal wage. For renegotiating rms, the match surplus can
be expressed as
Sfit = wit  
W it
Pt
+ (1  )Ett;t+1[wSf0it+1 + (1  w)Sfit+1]: (26)
The expression for Sf0it is the same, except for W

it being replaced by some nominal
wage agreed in the past. Using this, I can express the rm surplus as
Sfit = Et
1X
s=0
t;t+s(1  )ssw

wit+s   W

it
Pt+s

+(1  )(1  w)Et
1X
s=0
t;t+1+s(1  )sswSfit+s+1:
21See Taylor (1999) and the references therein.
22Staggered wage bargaining a la Calvo has been rst introduced by Gertler and Trigari (2006),
in a model that abstracts from nominal variables.
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Similarly, the worker surplus can be expressed as
Swit =
W it
Pt
  w
¯ it
+ (1  )Ett;t+1[wSw0it+1 + (1  w)Swit+1] (27)
= Et
1X
s=0
t;t+s(1  )ssw

W it
Pt+s
  w
¯ it+s

+(1  )(1  w)Et
1X
s=0
t;t+1+s(1  )sswSwit+s+1:
In rms that do renegotiate, the Nash bargaining rule applies,
(1  ")Sfit = "Swit : (28)
Since equation (28) holds in all states in which the wage is renegotiated, the Sfit+s+1
and Swit+s+1 terms in the expressions for rm and worker surplus cancel out. I thus
obtain the following expression for the nominal wage agreement,
Et
1X
s=0
t;t+s(1  )ssw

W it
Pt+s
  wnashit+s

= 0; (29)
where wnashit is given by equation (23). In a context of staggered wage bargaining,
wnashit must be interpreted as the real wage that would obtain if wages were Nash
bargained in every period, i.e. if wages were perfectly exible. For brevity, I will
refer to wnashit as the Nash wage in rm i. Therefore, according to equation (29)
the nominal wage agreed by both parties is such that, for the expected duration
of the wage contract, the real wage equals the Nash wage on average. Notice the
analogy with the pricing decision, equation (11): the same way that the marginal cost
constitutes the target price for multiperiod price contracts, the Nash wage represents
the target wage when rm and worker agree on a multiperiod wage contract.
From equation (8), the only source of heterogeneity in vacancy rates, zit, is next
periods real wages, Wit+1
Pt+1
(remember that, by equation 9, hours are equalized across
rms). I now guess that all renegotiating rms strike the same agreement,W it = W

t .
Since W t remains in place in those future states in which it is not renegotiated, if
follows from (23) and (19) that the expected value of every wnashit+s in (29) is the same
for all renegotiating rms, which veries my guess. Since renegotiating rms are
randomly chosen, the average nominal wage across rms evolves according to the
following law of motion,Z 1
0
Witdi  Wt = wWt 1 + (1  w)W t : (30)
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6 Linear-quadratic analysis
In the rest of the paper, I will follow the linear-quadratic (LQ) approach to monetary
policy analysis pioneered by Rotemberg andWoodford (1997) and extensively applied
in Woodford (2003, Ch. 6). This requires obtaining a second order approximation of
the representative householdswelfare criterion, as well as a rst order approximation
of the equilibrium conditions. As is well-known, this method has several advantages.
First, the quadratic welfare criterion claries what the stabilization objectives of the
central bank are. Second, a rst-order approximation of the equilibrium conditions is
enough to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of alternative policies with a degree of accuracy
of up to second order. Finally, this linear representation of the monetary transmission
mechanism makes it easier to understand what are the trade-o¤s for monetary policy.
6.1 The model in log-linear form
From now onwards, I assume the following functional forms for preferences over
consumption and leisure, as well as the production and matching technologies,
u(ct) =
c1 
 1
t
1   1 ;
v(ht) =
h1+t
1 + 
;
Atf(ntht; k) = At(ntht)
k1 ;
m(vt; ut) = v

tu
1 
t ;
Therefore,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and  is the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
For any variable eit, let e^it  log(eit=e) denote the log-deviation from its steady
state value, e. I start the approximation by log-linearizing the rms job creation
condition, equation (8). I then rescale it by y
n
to obtain
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^it   Et^t;t+1] = (31)
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv(1 +  )z^it+1 + (+  sv)'^t+1   sww^it+1
+(1  )(1 +  )sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1 +  z^it+1]g;
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where sv  hcy is total hiring costs as a fraction of GDP and sw  nwy is the labor
share of GDP, both in the steady state.23 In order to aggregate the individual job
creation condition, I make use of the following result,24
Lemma 1 The vacancy rate of any rm i admits the following log-linear approxi-
mation,
z^it = z^t    z(logWit   logWt);
where z^t 
R 1
0
z^itdi and
 z =
wsw
(1  w)(1 +  ) sv  
:
That is, relative vacancy rates are a negative function of relative wages. Intu-
itively, since the current nominal wage is kept constant in the following period with
some probability, rms with a higher current nominal wage expect a lower surplus
from new matches and therefore post fewer vacancies.
As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, this result allows me to obtain the following
aggregate job creation equation,
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^t   Et^t;t+1] = (32)
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv (1 +  )z^t+1 + (+  sv)'^t+1   sww^t+1
+(1  )(1 +  )sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1]g:
From t = vtut and ut = 1  nt, I can write, respectively,
^t = v^t   u^t;
u^t =  n
u
n^t:
Letting zt 
R
nit
nt
zitdi =
vt
nt
denote the average vacancy rate, I have
z^t = v^t   n^t:
The stochastic discount factor is given by ^t;t+1 = 
 1(c^t   c^t+1). The log-linear
approximation of the Beveridge curve, equation (1), is given by
n^t+1 = (1    p)n^t + ^t; (33)
23In the derivation of (31) I have also used the Beveridge curve in the steady state, 1q() =
v
n ,
where q()v is the total number of matches, as well as mpl =  ynh .
24The proof of all Lemmas is in Appendix A.
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where p  p() and I have used the fact that, in the steady state, pu
n
= . Aggregate
consumption c^t is controlled by the central bank by means of its interest rate policy.
Therefore, c^t will be determined by the monetary policy rule. The marginal product
of labor is given by dmplt = at   (1  )(n^t + h^t): (34)
Log-linearization of the hours decision and the aggregate resource constraint, equa-
tions (9) and (13) respectively, yields
'^t = h^t + 
 1c^t  dmplt; (35)
at + (n^t + h^t) = scc^t + sv[(1 +  )z^t + n^t]; (36)
where sc  cy = 1   sv is the consumption share of GDP in the steady state, and
in equation (36) I have used the fact that the price dispersion term ^t is actually a
second order term.25
By denition, real wage ination is equal to nominal wage ination minus price
ination,
w^t = w^t 1 + wt   t; (37)
where wt  log(Wt=Wt 1) and t  log(Pt=Pt 1). Log-linearizing equations (11)
and (12) and combining them, I obtain the familiar New-Keynesian Phillips curve,26
t = p'^t + Ett+1; (38)
where
p  (1  p)(1  p)
p
:
Therefore, real marginal costs are the only driving force of ination.
Solving for wage ination deserves more attention. I start by log-linearizing the
nominal wage agreement, equation (29),
Et
1X
s=0
s(1  )ssw
 
logW it   logPt+s   logw   w^nashit+s

= 0; (39)
where the rms period-t Nash wage is given by
sww^
nash
it = (1  ")[(dmplt + h^t) +  sv(1 +  )z^it + (+  sv)'^t] (40)
+"
"

 
h^t +
1 + ~b
1 + 
 1c^t
!
+ pSwy [^t + Et(^t;t+1 + S^
w
t+1)]
#
:
25See Appendix B.
26The derivation of equation (38) is fairly standard. See e.g. Walsh (2003, section 5.4).
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Swy  nS
w
y
is total worker surplus over GDP in the steady state and ~b  b
v(h)
is xed
work disutility over steady-state variable work disutility. Notice that all terms in
(40) except for z^it are common to all rms. Let w^nasht 
R 1
0
w^nashit di be the average
Nash wage. For a rm that has not changed its nominal wage since period t, I can
write
sww^
nash
it+s = sww^
nash
t+s + (1  ") sv(1 +  )(z^it+s   z^t+s) (41)
= sww^
nash
t+s   (1  ") sv(1 +  ) z(logW it   logWt+s);
where in the second equality I have used Lemma 1. From here, it is relatively
straightforward to derive the following result,
Lemma 2 Nominal wage ination is given by
wt = w(w^
nash
t   w^t) + Etwt+1; (42)
where
w  (1  w)(1  w)
w
1
1 + 
;
  s 1w (1  ") sv(1 +  ) z;
and   (1  ).
Therefore, the gap between the actual and the Nash average real wage is the
driving force of wage ination in this model. The reason is the following. The Nash
wage is the target wage for multiperiod wage contracts. To the extent that actual
real wages are e.g. below their target, renegotiating rms will increase their nominal
wages, with the resulting positive wage ination.27
Notice that the slope of equation (42) is analogous to that of the price ination
equation (38), with two di¤erences. First, the discount factor  in w takes into
account the fact that the job match survives in the following period with probability
(1 ), thus shortening the horizon of the bargaining parties. Second, w is reduced
by the presence of . This parameter represents an index of real rigidity in the sense
of Ball and Romer (1990), and it has the e¤ect of slowing the adjustment of nominal
wages. To see why, assume that the average Nash wage is expected to increase. A
renegotiating rm will then increase its nominal wage by a certain amount. This
27The Erceg et al. (2000) model produces a wage ination equation similar to (42), with the gap
between the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure and the average real
wage as the driving force. This is because in their model, the marginal rate of substitution is the
target for multiperiod nominal wage contracts.
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will lead to an increase in its relative wage, and by Lemma 1 to a fall in its relative
vacancy rate. But then its own Nash (target) wage will fall relative to the average,
which will lead the rm to undo some of the increase in its nominal wage. That is,
renegotiating rms adjust their wages by less than they would in the absence of real
rigidity. This e¤ect is absent in the case of prices, because the target price (i.e. the
marginal cost) does not depend on ones own pricing decision.28
It only remains to derive the average Nash wage. I now make use of the following
result,
Lemma 3 The worker surplus and the rm surplus, respectively, admit the following
log-linear approximation,
S^wit = S^
w
t + w(logWit   logWt);
S^fit = S^
f
t    f (logWit   logWt);
where S^wt 
R 1
0
S^witdi, S^
f
t 
R 1
0
S^fitdi and
w =
sw
[1  (1  )w]Swy
;
 f =
sw +  sv(1 +  ) z
[1  (1  )w]Sfy
;
where Swy  nS
w
y
and Sfy  nS
f
y
.
That is, the surplus enjoyed by workers in rm i relative to the average is increas-
ing in that rms relative wage. The opposite is true for the relative surplus enjoyed
by the rm. With Lemma 3 in hand, it is possible to obtain the following expression
for the average Nash wage,
Lemma 4 The average Nash wage is given by
sww^
nash
t = (1  ")[dmplt +  sv(1 +  )z^t + (+  sv)'^t] + h^t (43)
+"
1 + ~b
1 + 
 1c^t + (1  ")p(1 +  )sv


^t + '^t +  z^t   Etwt+1

;
where   (w +  f ) w1 w .
28The absence of real rigidity in price setting is due to my two-sector assumption and to retailers
linear production technology. This is not the case in the standard one-sector New Keynesian model
with decreasing returns in production, see e.g. Woodford (2003, section 3.1).
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Notice that log-linearization of the Nash wage in the exible-wage case, equation
(24), would yield the same expression as (43), except for the presence of Etwt+1.
With staggered wages, expected wage ination reduces the average Nash wage. To
see this, I log-linearize equation (30) in period t+ 1,
logW t+1   logWt+1 =
w
1  w (logWt+1   logWt);
When wage ination is positive, both sides of the equation are positive. A job
seeker that is matched to a non-renegotiating rm receives on average a negative
relative wage (since logWt < logWt+1) and, from Lemma 3, enjoys a negative relative
surplus. If she is matched to a renegotiating rm, from (28) I have S^wt+1 = S^
f
t+1; but
from logW t+1 > logWt+1 and Lemma 3, S^
f
t+1 is then lower than the average rm
surplus. Either way, wage ination reduces the expected average surplus for job
seekers, relative to the expected average rm surplus (given by ^t + '^t +  z^t in
equation 43). This reduces the outside option for workers and therefore the Nash
wage.
6.2 The quadratic welfare criterion
The second step of the LQ method consists of deriving a second order approximation
of the welfare criterion, which will be the objective function in the central banks
optimal monetary policy problem. At this point, I assume that the steady state of
this economy is e¢ cient. As seen in section 4, this requires making the following two
assumptions.
Assumption 1 Retailer sales are subsidized at the rate s =   1.
Assumption 2 The Hosios condition is satised: " = .
The reason for assuming an e¢ cient steady state is that the linear terms in
the second order approximation of the welfare criterion disappear, because their
coe¢ cients are zero. As shown by Benigno and Woodford (2005a, 2005b), when the
steady state is not e¢ cient, it is necessary to perform second order approximations
of the equilibrium conditions in order to substitute for the linear terms in the welfare
criterion. This is cumbersome even in the most standard New Keynesian model (see
Benigno and Woodford, 2005a). In order to simplify the analysis, I will constrain it
to the case of an e¢ cient steady state.
23
I now obtain the following second order approximation of the welfare criterion,29
1X
t=0
t fu(ct)  nt [v(ht) + b]g =  

1X
t=0
tLt + t:i:p:+O
3; (44)
where 
  u0(c)y
2
> 0, t:i:p: represents terms independent of policy as of date 0, Ok
are terms of order k-th and higher in the size of the exogenous shock, and Lt is a
purely quadratic loss function given by
Lt  p2t + w2wt + Ln;ht ; (45)
where p  sc p , w  (1 +  )sv 2z
 
w
1 w
1 w and
Ln;ht  sc 1c^2t + [(n^t + h^t)2 + h^2t ]  [at + (n^t + h^t)]2 + (1+ )sv[(1  )^
2
t + z^
2
t ]:
Equation (45) illustrates the central banks stabilization objectives. First, when
price setting is staggered, ination causes price dispersion. From the aggregate re-
source constraint, equation (13), price dispersiont increases the amount of resources
needed produce a certain amount of the consumption basket, ct. As a result, ina-
tion causes a welfare loss. Second, under staggered wage bargaining, wage ination
causes wage dispersion. From Lemma 1, wage dispersion creates dispersion in hiring
rates.30 Since hiring costs are convex in hiring rates, from equation (13) dispersion
in hiring rates increases the amount of resources used in vacancy posting. Therefore,
wage ination too reduces welfare.
The term Ln;ht measures the success of monetary policy in stabilizing (un)employment
and hours around their e¢ cient paths. Indeed, the expected present discounted sum
of Ln;ht is exactly the second order approximation of the social planners objective
function. To see this, I minimize
E0
1X
t=0
t

sc
 1c^2t + [(n^t + h^t)
2 + h^2t ]  [at + (n^t + h^t)]2
+(1 +  )sv[(1  )(v^t + nu n^t)2 +  (v^t   n^t)2]

(46)
with respect to c^t, h^t, v^t and n^t, subject to the log-linear approximations of the
Beveridge curve (equation 33 with v^t + nu n^t replacing ^t) and the aggregate resource
29The proof is in Appendix B.
30Strictly speaking, a rms hiring rate is given by q(t) vitnit , i.e. the product of the matching rate
for vacancies and the vacancy rate. However, since the former is the same for all rms, dispersion in
vacancy rates is equivalent to dispersion in hiring rates. From now onwards, I treat both concepts
as synonyms.
24
constraint (equation 36 with v^t   n^t replacing z^t). These are the two constraints on
the social planner problem. Let nt and 
c
t be the Lagrange multipliers on (33) and
(36), respectively. The rst order conditions are given by
ct = 
 1c^t;dmplt = h^t + ct ;
(1 +  )
sv

[(1  )^t +  z^t   ct ] = Etnt+1;
nt = 
dmplt +  (1 +  )svz^t   (+  sv)ct   (1 +  )sv p(1  )^t
+[1    (1  )p]Etnt+1;
where dmplt is given by (34). Combining the rst two conditions, I havedmplt = h^t +  1c^t; (47)
which is exactly the log-linear approximation of the social planners hours decision,
equation (14). Combining the last two conditions, I have31
(1 +  )
sv

[(1  )^t +  z^t   Et^t;t+1] (48)
= Etf
"
dmplt+1 +  sv(1 +  )z^t+1    1 + ~b1 +  1c^t+1
#
+[1    (1  )p](1 +  )sv

 z^t+1 + (1    p)(1 +  )sv

(1  )^t+1g;
which is exactly the log-linear approximation of the e¢ cient job creation condition,
equation (17). This should be no surprise: since the objective function is purely
quadratic, the rst order conditions of the linear-quadratic problem are the same as
the log-linearized rst order conditions of the exact problem.
It follows from the preceding analysis that (46) attains its minimum (though
not zero) value in the social planner allocation. In the decentralized economy, the
presence of price and wage stickiness will distort hours and hiring decisions. This
will create ine¢ cient variation in the terms in (46), and therefore a greater welfare
loss.
31In order to form the ^t;t+1 term in the left hand side of (48), I am using equation (17) in the
steady state, rescaled by yn ,
(1 +  )
sv

f1  [1    (1  )p]g = 
 
   ~b
1 + 
+  sv
!
:
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6.3 Policy trade-o¤s
It is now possible to illustrate easily the trade-o¤s that the central bank faces. As-
sume that, consistent with the case for price stability, the central bank sets t = 0 in
every period. By equation (38), this requires stabilizing the marginal cost, '^t = 0.
From equation (35), the hours decision would be given exactly by the social planners
hours decision, equation (47). This does not imply however that hours follow their
e¢ cient path: any distortion in aggregate hiring results in distortion in aggregate
consumption c^t (through the resource constraint, equation 36), and therefore in h^t.
As I will show, aggregate hiring is distorted when t = 0. However, if hiring costs are
small as a fraction of GDP (as I assume later on), this distortion is not quantitatively
important.
The zero ination policy exacerbates other, more important distortions. The
failure of some nominal wages to adjust creates a gap between the actual and the
Nash average real wage. To see this, I can combine (37) and (42) and impose t = 0
to express the average real wage as a weighted average of its own lag, its expected
lead and the Nash wage,
w^t = bw^t 1 + (1  b   f )w^nasht + fEtw^t+1;
where
b 
w
w + ww + w
;
f 
w
w + ww + w
;
and limw!0 ww = 1. Therefore, the only way that w^t equals w^
nash
t is if w = 0,
i.e. if nominal wages are exible. If w > 0, real wages will lag behind Nash wages
and from (42) wage ination will be non-zero. Following e.g. a negative productivity
shock, Nash wages fall on impact. Since Nash wages are the target for multiperiod
wage contracts, nominal wages in renegotiating rms will fall. This results in wage
deation and thus in ine¢ cient wage dispersion. Therefore, staggered wages induce
a trade-o¤ between price and wage ination. This trade-o¤ is also present in Erceg
et al. (2000), but in a framework that is subject to Barros critique.
On the other hand, I can express the real wage as w^t = w^nasht + (w^t   w^nasht ).
Inserting this in (32), using (43) to substitute for sww^nasht+1 and imposing " =  and
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'^t = '^t+1 = 0, I can represent the job creation equation under ination targeting as
(1 +  )
sv

[(1  )^t +  z^t   Et^t;t+1] (49)
= Etf
"
dmplt+1 +  sv(1 +  )z^t+1    1 + ~b1 +  1c^t+1
#
+[1    (1  )p](1 +  )sv

 z^t+1 + (1    p)(1 +  )sv

(1  )^t+1
 sw(w^t+1   w^nasht+1 ) + (1  )p(1 +  )
sv

wt+2g:
This is the same as the social-planners job creation condition, equation (48), except
for the two terms in the last line. That is, job creation under the zero ination policy
is ine¢ cient. Following e.g. a negative productivity shock that reduces Nash wages
on impact, the failure of some nominal wages to fall leads the expected average real
wage to be too high relative to its Nash counterpart. This amplies the negative
e¤ect of the shock on the protability of posting vacancies. On the other hand,
renegotiating rms will reduce their nominal wages in order to bring real wages
closer to their target; this will create expectations of future deation, which from
Lemma 4 increases the average Nash wage and further reduces the incentives to
hire. Therefore, both e¤ects work towards raising unemployment above its e¢ cient
path. It follows that there is also a trade-o¤ between ination and unemployment
stabilization.
The tension among goals is resolved as follows. Continuing with the example of
a negative shock, the central bank should allow for a temporary increase in ination.
This way, by equation (37) it can accelerate the convergence of real wages towards
their Nash counterparts. Since actual wages are then closer to their targets, rene-
gotiating rms will cut their nominal wages by less, thus reducing wage dispersion.
Also, the smaller expected gap in wages and the smaller expected wage deation
reduce the negative e¤ect of the shock on the protability of posting vacancies, thus
bringing unemployment closer to its e¢ cient path.
Quantifying the magnitude of these trade-o¤s and the optimal policy response to
shocks is the purpose of section 6.5. Before turning to this and the calibration of
the model, it is now worth to consider the nature of optimal monetary policy in two
limiting cases: exible wages and exible prices.
6.3.1 Flexible wages
If nominal wages are fully exible, w = 0, then the weight on wage ination in the
loss function, w, disappears, such that wage ination is not a concern for the central
27
bank anymore. Equation (42) becomes w^t = w^nasht . The central bank can then set
'^t = 0 and thus eliminate price ination. On the other hand, job creation would be
given by (49), with w^t+1   w^nasht+1 = 0 and  = 0; this would yield exactly equation
(48), which is the social planners job creation decision. Since '^t = 0 and there is
no distortion in vacancy posting, hours too are at their e¢ cient level. Therefore, the
monetary authority would be able to replicate the rst-best allocation. This is just
a restatement of Proposition 1, which claims the same result for the model in exact
form.
6.3.2 Flexible prices
If prices are fully exible, p = 0, then p in the loss function becomes 0 and ination
has no welfare consequences. Furthermore, all retailers set price equal to marginal
cost, which implies 't = 1, or '^t = 0. The central bank can then ensure that
w^t = w^
nash
t holds at all times by adjusting price ination in (37) accordingly.
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(42), wage ination and thus wage dispersion are eliminated. Using (43) to substitute
for w^t+1 = w^nasht+1 in (32) and imposing wt+2 = 0, the job creation equation is exactly
the same as its social planner counterpart, equation (48). Therefore, when prices are
exible, the monetary authority is also able to replicate the rst-best equilibrium.
6.4 Calibration
In what follows, I assume a monthly frequency for the model. On the one hand, as
emphasized by Gertler and Trigari (2006), a monthly calibration is better able to
capture the high rate of job nding in the US. Second, and more importantly, the
committees of the worlds major central banks hold meetings every month in order
to make their interest rate decisions.33 Ination data and forecasts, on which policy
decisions are largely based, have a monthly frequency too.
As in most of the business cycle literature, I set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution  to 1, a value which is consistent with balanced growth in the
neoclassical growth model. Regarding the Frisch elasticity of labor supply  1, there
is traditionally a conict between the low values estimated in the micro empirical
literature (up to 0.5; see e.g. Card 1994) and the values higher than unity used in the
macro literature on the basis of balanced growth considerations (see e.g. Cooley and
32In the exible price case, it is still possible for the central bank to control the price level through
the consumption Euler equation. See Woodford (2003, Ch. 2) for more details.
33This is the case for the Bank of England, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan.
The US Federal Reserve holds eight regularly scheduled meetings every year, but more meetings
are held when needed.
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Prescott, 1995). Therefore, I choose a compromise value of 1. The discount factor 
is set to 0:99
1
3 . The autocorrelation of the productivity shock is set to a = 0:95
1
3 .
For the matching function, I set  equal to 0.6, following the US evidence in
Blanchard and Diamond (1989). As in Gertler and Trigari (2006), I use a monthly
separation rate of  = 0:035, in order to match the evidence that jobs last for two
years and a half. Shimer (2005) calculates a monthly job-nding rate of 0.276 for
the US; I thus set p = 0:30. From the Beveridge curve, this implies a steady-state
unemployment rate of u = =(p + ) = 0:10, which is reasonable if we allow the
model unemployment rate to include those individuals registered as inactive that are
actively searching for jobs.34. The employment rate is thus 1  n = 0:90. Following
the evidence in Merz and Yashiv (2004), the degree of convexity of hiring costs is set
to  = 2.
Following most of the search and matching literature, I set sv = 0:01.35 I now
consider the Nash wage, equation (24), in the steady state and rescale it by y
n
to
obtain
sw = (1  )
h
+  sv + (1 +  )sv
n
u
i
+ 
1 + ~b
1 + 
; (50)
On the other hand, equation (17) in the steady state can be rescaled by y
n
to obtain
(1 +  )
sv

f1  [1    (1  )p]g = 
"
   ~b
1 + 
+  sv
#
: (51)
Assuming a labor share of GDP of sw = 2=3, I can use (50) and (51) to solve for 
and ~b, obtaining values of 0.68 and 0.39, respectively.
Regarding the New Keynesian side of the model, I assume an elasticity of substi-
tution across goods  of 7.67, which in the absence of the sales subsidy would imply
that retailers charge a mark-up of 15% over marginal costs. Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2005) nd that 26% of prices are changed every month in the US; therefore I choose
p = 1   0:25 = 0:75. This implies an elasticity of ination with respect to mar-
ginal costs of p = 0:084. The latter implies a weight on ination stabilization of
p = 90:18.
Most wages in the US are renegotiated once a year (see e.g. Gottschalk, 2004).
This suggests an average wage duration of 1
1 w = 12 months, or w = 0:92. The
resulting degree of strategic complementarity in wage bargaining,  = 0:15, turns
out to be quite small. The slope of the wage ination equation is then given by
34The evidence shows that ows from inactivity to employment account for a large fraction of
total ows to employment in the US, see e.g. Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
35See e.g. Andolfatto (1996) and Gertler and Trigari (2006).
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w = 0:0094. The elasticity of vacancy rates with respect to relative wages is  z =
4:11. These values imply a weight on wage ination of w = 129:18. Once we rescale
all the weights in the loss function by their sum, price and wage ination receive
weights of 57 and 41 per cent, respectively, for a total of 98 per cent. See Table 1 for
a summary of parameter values.
Table 1. Parameter values
 0.035  0.6  7.67  z 4.11
p 0.30  1 p 0.75 p 90.18
 2  1 w 0.92 w 129.2
a 0.983 ~b 0.39 p 0.084  0.997
 0.68 sw 0.67 w 0.0094 sv 0.01
6.5 Simulation
6.5.1 Zero ination policy
I start the quantitative analysis by simulating the behavior of the decentralized
economy when the central bank pursues a policy of full ination stabilization, t =
0.36 Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1 plot the economys response to a 1 per cent
negative productivity shock.37 The fall in the marginal product of jobs reduces the
Nash wage on impact. Given that the Nash wage is the target in wage negotiations,
nominal wages in renegotiating rms fall accordingly. This results in wage deation.
On the other hand, the fall in productivity reduces the protability of posting
vacancies and therefore job creation. As a result, unemployment increases. The
fall in job creation is amplied by the stickiness of nominal wages, which further
reduces the value of posting vacancies. To see this, I compute the response of the
social planner economy to the same shock. As seen in Figure 2, unemployment
increases too in the rst-best allocation, albeit by less than under the zero ination
policy. This can also be seen in Figure 3, where the dotted solid line represents the
unemployment response under the zero ination policy net of the same response in
the e¢ cient allocation.3839
36The log-linear model is solved using Uhligs (1999) undetermined coe¢ cients method.
37Price and wage ination responses are expressed as annualized rates, i.e. 12t and 12wt.
38Notice that the net responses in Figure 3 become negative after 23 and 33 months, respectively.
The reason is that, even though unemployment responds less in the social planner allocation, it
also returns to its steady state level more slowly than under the two policies considered.
39The response of hours per worker is very weak, with a peak at 0.08%, and a maximum absolute
deviation from its e¢ cient path of 0.06%, which conrms my previous claim that this distortion is
quantitatively negligible.
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Therefore, targeting zero ination generates ine¢ cient outcomes in unemploy-
ment and wage ination. Since the central bank also cares about the latter two
objectives (especially wage ination, which receives a 57 per cent weight in the loss
function under the chosen calibration), it will nd it optimal to strike a balance
among the three objectives.
6.5.2 Optimal policy commitment
At time 0, the central bank chooses the state-contingent plan that minimizes
E0
1X
t=0
t
(
p
2
t + w
2
wt + sc
 1c^2t + [(n^t + h^t)
2 + h^2t ]
 [at + (n^t + h^t)]2 + (1 +  )sv[(1  )^2t +  z^2t ]
)
;
subject to the job creation condition (equation 32), the Beveridge curve (33), the
marginal product of labor (34) and marginal cost (35) equations, the resource con-
straint (36), the real wage equation (37), the Phillips curve (38), the wage ination
(42) and Nash wage (43) equations, as well as ^t;t+1 = 
 1(c^t   c^t+1), ^t = v^t + nu n^t
and z^t = v^t   n^t.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1 show the economys response to a 1 per cent
negative productivity shock, under the optimal monetary policy commitment. The
distortions created by staggered wage bargaining are reected in the failure of actual
wages to track their exible-wage (Nash) counterparts. Relative to the situation
under ination targeting, the central bank can improve matters by creating a certain
amount of ination and thus accelerating the convergence of real wages towards
their Nash counterparts. This can be seen by comparing panels (b) and (d): whereas
such convergence takes 40 months under the zero ination policy, it takes only 25
months under the optimal policy. This allows the central bank to reduce wage
deation and the subsequent dispersion in hiring rates. The smaller gap in wages
and the smaller expected wage deation also reduce the negative e¤ect of the shock
on the protability of posting vacancies. As a result, vacancies fall by less, and
unemployment increases by less, than under the zero ination policy. This can also
be seen in Figure 3, where unemployment (net of its e¢ cient path) is less volatile
than under ination targeting.40
40The hours response is again very weak, with a peak at 0.06%, and a maximum absolute deviation
from its e¢ cient path of 0.05%.
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6.5.3 Welfare loss from ination targeting
The suboptimality of the zero ination policy depends on the frequency of nominal
wage adjustment. Indeed, the weight on wage ination in the loss function, w, is
an increasing and convex function of w: rst, the less synchronization there is in
nominal wage changes, the greater the wage dispersion caused by wage ination;
second, since  z is an increasing function of w, from Lemma 1 wage dispersion will
induce a greater dispersion in hiring rates and thus a greater welfare loss. In addition,
greater stickiness of nominal wages means a bigger gap between the actual and the
Nash average real wage and therefore greater distortions in job creation.
Figure 4 plots the value of
E(Lt)  E(Lspt )
as a function of the mean duration of nominal wage contracts ( 1
1 w ). Lt is the
loss function given by (45) and E(Lspt ) is the value of E(Lt) in the social planner
allocation (i.e. its minimum possible value).41 The solid and dotted solid lines
represent the net expected welfare loss under the optimal and the zero ination
policy, respectively. If nominal wages are completely exible (i.e. if contracts last
for 1
1 0 = 1 month on average), from Proposition 1 the optimal policy is precisely
the zero ination policy, and the welfare loss is the same as in the social planner
economy. For moderate contract durations, ination targeting is still a very good
approximation to the optimal policy. However, as wage contracts become longer, the
distortions caused by wage dispersion and ine¢ cient job creation become very large,
and the central banks failure to adjust real wages by using ination starts taking its
toll on welfare. Thus, whereas net expected welfare losses under the zero ination
policy are just 10% higher than under the optimal policy for mean contract durations
of 6 months, they are 45% higher when contracts last for 9 months, and 106% higher
under the 12-month wage contracts assumed in the baseline calibration.
Since price and wage ination receive most of the weight in the loss function, I
also consider policy rules that stabilize a properly chosen weighted average of price
and wage ination. That is, among the following family of rules,
wt + (1  )t = 0;
the weight  2 [0; 1] is chosen so as to minimize the unconditional expectation of
equation (45). The dashed line in Figure 4 represents the net expected welfare loss
41The gure assumes a standard deviation for the shock to productivity, "at , of 0.7%. However,
since the productivity shock is the only source of aggregate uncertainty in this model, the relative
welfare losses under alternative policies do not depend on the volatility of the shock.
32
under this rule, again as a function of mean contract duration. This policy therefore
is nearly optimal for any contract length. For the baseline of 12-month contracts,
the optimal weight is given by  = 59:3% (i.e. slightly more than the relative weight
on wage ination stabilization), and the net expected loss under this policy is only
4.8% higher than under the optimal commitment.
6.5.4 The bargaining set
As claimed in the introduction, this framework is free of Barros (1977) critique, be-
cause preset nominal wages do not distort existing employment relationships. Hours
per employee are independent of wages, because they are chosen so as to maximize
the joint match surplus. Regarding the continuation of existing jobs, the failure of
some nominal wages to adjust must not lead to the break-up of otherwise e¢ cient
employment relationships, in the form of either quits or rings. That is, in every
rm (renegotiating or not) both employer and employees must always enjoy a non-
negative surplus: Sfit; S
w
it  0;8i; t. From equations (18) and (20), this means that
the real wage, wit, must always lie inside the bargaining set, i.e. the set of wages
above the workers reservation wage and below the rms reservation wage,
wit 2 [ wit + (1  )Ett;t+1Sfit+1;w¯ t   (1  )Ett;t+1S
w
it+1]:
In the exible-wage case, the Nash wage is just the weighted average of the two
bounds of the bargaining set (the continuation values would cancel out as a result
of the bargaining rule, producing expression 23); therefore, actual wages are always
inside the bargaining set. However, when renegotiations are infrequent, it is only in
renegotiating rms that the wage equals the weighted average of both reservation
wages; in all other rms, it is not guaranteed that wages lie inside the bargaining set.
With large enough shocks and in rms with su¢ ciently old nominal wages, the latter
are bound to fall outside the bargaining set. This section shows that, for shocks of
empirically plausible size, the vast majority of wages remain inside the bargaining
set.
The fraction of rms that last changed their wage k periods ago is given by
(1  w)kw. Following Gertler and Trigari (2006), I calculate the minimum value of ~k
such that the fraction of rms with wages older than ~k periods, 1 P~kk=0(1  w)kw,
is less than 1 per cent. For my baseline of 12-month wage contracts (w = 12 112 ),
~k
is equal to 52 months.
Up to a log-linear approximation, a rms surplus is proportional to 1+S^fit. Using
Lemma 3, it follows that the rms surplus is positive if and only if
logWit < logWt + 
 1
f (1 + S^
f
t )  logRft ;
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where Rft is the rms reservation wage in nominal terms. Log-linearizing the ex-
pression for the rm surplus, equation (26) for any i, and using Lemma 1 to average
across rms, I can express the average rm surplus (rescaled by y
n
) as
Sfy S^
f
t = (dmplt+h^t)+ sv(1+ )z^t+(+ sv)'^t sww^t+(1 )SfyEt(^t;t+1+S^ft+1):
Similarly, from Lemma 3 the worker surplus is positive up to a log-linear approxi-
mation if and only if
logWit > logWt    1w (1 + S^wt )  logRwt ;
where Rft is the workers reservation wage in nominal terms. Log-linearizing the
worker surplus, equation (27) for any i, and aggregating across rms yields the
following expression for the average worker surplus,
Swy S^
w
t = sww^t   
 
h^t +
1 + ~b
1 + 
 1c^t
!
  pSwy ^t + (1    p)Swy Et(^t;t+1 + S^wt+1):
In rms that last negotiated 52 months ago, the nominal wage equals logW t 52. I
therefore require that logW t 52 is between logR
f
t and logR
w
t at all times,
logRwt  logW t 52  logRft :
In order to check that this condition holds for a reasonably large sample size, I
simulate 1,000 observations of the model economy, under both the zero ination
and the optimal policy. I assume that the shock to exogenous productivity, "at , is
normally distributed with mean zero and a standard deviation of 0.7% (see Prescott,
1986). The upper panels of Figures 5 and 6 show the reservation wages as well as
logW t 52 (all deated by the price level, logPt) for the optimal and the zero ination
policy, respectively. In both cases, the actual wage never falls outside the bargaining
set. Therefore, I can conclude that, at least for 99% of all rms, Barros critique is
avoided.
It is also interesting to analyze how rm and worker surplus in this group of
rms behave in response to shocks. From Lemma 3, in rms that last negotiated 52
months ago, the rm and worker surplus are given, respectively, by
S^ft    f (logW t 52   logWt);
S^wt + w(logW

t 52   logWt):
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The lower panels of Figures 5 and 6 plot both surplus values under the optimal and
the zero ination policy, respectively. Not surprisingly, both surplus values behave
fairly symmetrically; in a boom, for instance, the stickiness of the nominal wage
leads the rms surplus to increase and the workers to shrink. In both cases, rm
and worker always enjoy a positive surplus in this group of rms, conrming the
results from the upper panels. Notice that uctuations in the surplus values are
much larger under the zero ination policy, which leads the former to come closer to
the zero bound. This is due to better stabilization of the economy under the optimal
policy. This is also the reason why the wage comes closer to the boundaries of the
bargaining set under the zero ination policy.
7 Further discussion
7.1 Output gap targeting
So far I havent made any reference to the output gap, i.e. the gap between the actual
and the e¢ cient level of output. This variable features prominently in monetary
policy discussions in the New Keynesian literature.42 E¢ cient output is the output
level in the social planner economy, or equivalently (under my assumption of an
e¢ cient steady state) the output level that would be observed in the decentralized
economy if both prices and wages were exible. Aggregate output is given by yt R 1
0
yitdi = Atf(htnt; k). In terms of log-deviations from steady state,
y^t  at + (n^t + h^t): (52)
Conditional on the employment stock, e¢ cient output in any period t is given by
y^et  at + (n^t + h^et );
where h^et is the e¢ cient level of hours. Using equations (34) and (36) to substitute
for dmplt and c^t in the social planners hours decision, equation (47), I obtain the
following expression, which implicitly denes h^et ,
at   (1  )(n^t + h^et) = h^et +  1s 1c fat + (n^t + h^et )  sv[(1 +  )v^et   n^t]g: (53)
v^et is the e¢ cient level of vacancies and is determined by the social planners job
creation decision, equation (48).43 Since it is not possible to obtain an explicit
42See e.g. Woodford (2003) and Clarida et al. (1999).
43In equation (48), the e¢ cient levels of labor market tightness and the average vacancy rate are
given by ^
e
t = v^
e
t   ( un n^t) and z^et = v^et   n^t, respectively.
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solution for v^et in terms of the economys state (at, n^t), it is useful at this point to
assume that hiring costs are small as a fraction of GDP. In particular, I assume that
sv is rst order in the size of the exogenous shock,
Assumption 3 sv = O1
Therefore, rst order terms multiplied by sv are actually of second order.44 Using
this, I can eliminate the z^t and n^t terms from (53). This, together with sc = 1 sv =
1 +O1, allows me to write
h^et =
1   1
( 1 + !)
at   !p + 
 1
 1 + !
n^t +O
2;
where !  !w + !p, and !w   and !p  1  are the output elasticities of the
marginal disutility and the marginal product of labor, respectively. The e¢ cient
level of output is then given by
y^et =
1 + !
 1 + !
at +

 1 + !
n^t +O
2: (54)
Notice that y^et is increasing in n^t. The larger the number of workers, the greater
the amount of output that can be produced before the marginal disutility of work
catches up with the marginal product of labor. The output gap is given by
xt  y^t   y^et = y^t  

1 + !
 1 + !
at +

 1 + !
n^t

+O2:
Under Assumption 3, consumption equals output up to a rst-order approximation,
c^t = y^t + O
2. Combining this with (35), (34) and (52), I can express real marginal
costs as
'^t = (
 1 + !)xt +O2:
This in turn allows me to write the Phillips curve, equation (38), as
t = xt + Ett+1 +O
2; (55)
where   ( 1+!)p. Therefore, under the assumption of small hiring costs, closing
the output gap is equivalent to eliminating ination up to a rst order approxima-
tion. This result stems from the following. First, conditional on the employment
stock, stabilizing output is equivalent to stabilizing hours per worker. Second, hours
44Notice that the calibrated value of sv, 0.01, is consistent with Assumption 3.
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determination is privately e¢ cient and therefore independent of wages, such that
hours are distorted by price stickiness and ine¢ ciency in vacancy posting, but not
by wage stickiness. Therefore, if vacancy posting costs are small as a fraction of
output, the policy that eliminates the distortionay e¤ects of price stickiness (i.e. the
zero ination policy) is approximately the same as the one that stabilizes output.
This result has important policy implications. As shown by Woodford (2003,
sections 3.4 and 6.4.4), in the Erceg et al. (2000) model stabilizing the output
gap is equivalent to stabilizing a weighted average of price and wage ination, with
weights depending on the relative stickiness of prices and wages. Since price and wage
ination receive most of the weight in the loss function in a plausible calibration of
that model, it turns out that output gap stabilization is nearly optimal for any degree
of relative wage stickiness (and exactly optimal in one parametric case). However,
in the present model, by equation (55) stabilizing the output gap is equivalent to
stabilizing ination, with an error that is second order. Therefore, the welfare losses
from output gap targeting should be similar to those from ination targeting. The
dotted line in Figure 4 shows the net expected welfare loss under the following rule,
y^t =
1 + !
 1 + !
at +

 1 + !
n^t; (56)
i.e. when the central bank closes the output gap up to a rst order approximation.45
Because this policy is approximately equivalent to the zero ination policy, it also
encounters the latters problems, and it becomes more and more suboptimal as the
contract length increases. Under 12-month contracts, net welfare losses are 51%
higher than under the optimal commitment.
7.2 Replacing staggered wages with a wage norm
Modelling wage determination as the result of staggered bargaining of nominal wages
is motivated by the evidence that nominal wages are indeed staggered (see Taylor,
1999). Using the Calvo mechanism of wage staggering has the advantage that the
parameter regulating the degree of staggering, w, can be calibrated empirically, to
match either the fraction of nominal wages that change in a typical month, or the
average duration of nominal wage contracts (which in the model equals 1
1 w ). By
contrast, most studies that integrate New Keynesian and search and matching mod-
els assume that real wages are set as a weighted average of the Nash real wage and
45Notice from Figure 4 that, when wages are exible, the net welfare loss under output gap
targeting is not zero. This is because there is a second-order di¤erence between the t = 0 policy
(which attains zero net welfare loss when wages are exible) and the policy described by (56).
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a symmetric real wage norm.46 This wage norm can take many forms, but last pe-
riods wage or a constant wage are usually considered. As emphasized by Gertler
and Trigari (2006), calibrating the partial adjustment coe¢ cient in this kind of wage
equations is an ad hoc exercise. However, beyond the question of empirical applica-
bility, how wage determination is modelled also has important policy implications.
Staggering of nominal wages creates ine¢ cient wage dispersion, and targeting zero
ination only makes this problem worse. If wages follow instead a partial adjust-
ment equation based on a symmetric wage norm, there is no wage dispersion. As
a consequence, considering a wage norm rather than staggered wages is likely to
underestimate the extent to which targeting zero ination is suboptimal.
Replacing staggered wages with a wage norm in this model is straightforward.
Equations (29) and (30) are replaced by
Wt
Pt
 wt = wnormt + (1  )wnasht ;
where wnormt is the wage norm, w
nash
t is still given by (23), without subscript i, and
 2 [0; 1]. In the absence of wage dispersion, the loss function is given by (45)
without the 2wt term. The model remains unchanged otherwise. Figure 7 plots the
net expected welfare loss under the optimal and the zero ination policy when the
wage norm is last periods real wage, wnormt = wt 1. The only distortion created now
by wage rigidity is ine¢ cient job creation. As the gure makes clear, zero ination
is nearly optimal for any value of  (in fact, both lines are indistinguishable). Since
wage ination no longer creates a welfare loss, price ination now receives almost all
of the weight (95%) in the loss function. As a result, the trade-o¤between preventing
price dispersion (i.e. ination) and preventing distortions in the unemployment path
is resolved in favor of the former. Figure 8 repeats the same exercise for the case in
which the wage norm is the steady-state real wage, wnormt = w. Again, the absence
of wage dispersion makes zero ination nearly optimal for any degree of real wage
rigidity.
There is a caveat to these results. The Calvo model of price staggering, with
its constant probability of price adjustment, is likely to exaggerate the degree of
price dispersion, because the age distribution of prices has a very long tail (i.e.
there is always a non-negligible fraction of rms with very old prices). More realistic
alternatives, such as the Taylor model (where prices last for a xed number of periods)
or Sheedys (2006) model (where adjustment probabilities are increasing in the age
of the contract), would deliver smaller welfare losses from targeting zero ination.
46This is the approach taken in Blanchard and Gali (forthcoming; 2006), Krause and Lubik (2005)
and Christo¤el and Linzert (2005). The wage norm was introduced by Hall (2005).
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8 Conclusions
In this paper I have analyzed optimal monetary policy in an economy with search and
matching frictions in the labor market, as well as staggered nominal wage and price
contracts. So far, the literature had integrated the New Keynesian and the search
and matching paradigms with an exclusively positive focus, namely to improve the
empirical performance of general equilibrium models of the monetary transmission
mechanism and to allow these models to say something about labor market phenom-
ena such as unemployment, vacancies and job ows.47
I have shown that, when wages are Nash bargained in every period and the econ-
omys steady state is e¢ cient, the central bank can replicate the rst-best equilibrium
by targeting zero ination. However, the empirically relevant case is that in which
only a fraction of rms renegotiate nominal wages. This creates two types of distor-
tion when the economy is hit by real shocks: ine¢ cient job creation and dispersion
in hiring rates. Keeping the price level constant only magnies these distortions.
Therefore, the optimal policy commitment allows for non-zero ination in response
to shocks: the central bank uses price ination to accelerate the convergence of ac-
tual real wages towards their exible-wage (Nash) counterparts. Quantitatively, the
welfare loss created by the zero ination policy turns out to be sizeable. This result
contrasts with the standard New Keynesian models recommendation of committing
to constant prices even in the face of real shocks, also known as the case for price
stability.
The model presented here abstracts from important labor market regulations that
constrain rmsability to adjust employment and hours per employee in response
to shocks. Such regulations include ring costs, overtime premia and limitations on
working hours. It would be interesting to incorporate the latter in this framework, so
as to understand their inuence on the monetary transmission mechanism and opti-
mal monetary policy. Given the considerable di¤erence in labor market regulations
between two major monetary areas like the US and the EU, this should be high on
the monetary policy research agenda.
47The only exception is the independent work by Blanchard and Gali (2006), who also analyze
optimal monetary policy under search and matching frictions.
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A. Proofs of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma 1
The rms hiring decision, equation (31) in the text, can be written as
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^it   Et^t;t+1] = (A1)
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv (1 +  )z^it+1 + (+  sv)'^t+1   sww^it+1
+(1  )(1 +  )sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1]g:
I now make the following guess
z^it = z^t    z(logWit   logWt);
which implies
z^0it = z^
0
t    z(logWit 1   logWt 1); (A2)
where z^0t  E0i z^0it is the average vacancy rate across non-renegotiating rms. I
have also used the fact that, since non-renegotiating rms are randomly chosen, this
groups average wage is just last periods wage index. Inserting (A2) in (A1), I obtain
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^it   Et^t;t+1] =
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv (1 +  )[w(z^0t+1    z ~wit) + (1  w)z^t+1] + (+  sv)'^t+1
 sw[ww^0it+1 + (1  w)w^t+1] + (1  )(1 +  )
sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1]g
where ~wit  logWit   logWt is the rms relative wage and z^t+1 is the common
vacancy rate of renegotiating rms. I can express a non-renegotiating rms real
wage as
w^0it+1 = logWit   logPt+1   logw = ~wit + logWt   logPt+1   logw:
This allows me to write
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^it   Et^t;t+1] = (A3)
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv (1 +  )(z^t+1   w z ~wit) + (+  sv)'^t+1
 sw[w ~wit + w^t+1] + (1  )(1 +  )sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1]g;
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where I have also used logWt+1 = w logWt + (1   w) logW t+1, which is equation
(30) in the text log-linearized. Averaging across i, and using Ei ~wit = 0, I obtain
(1 +  )
sv

['^t + (1  )^t +  z^t   Et^t;t+1] = (A4)
Etf(dmplt+1 + h^t+1) +  sv (1 +  )z^t+1 + (+  sv)'^t+1
 sww^t+1 + (1  )(1 +  )sv

['^t+1 + (1  )^t+1]g;
which is equation (32) in the text. Substracting (A4) from (A3), and using my guess,
I obtain
(1 +  )
sv

 (z^it   z^t) =  (1 +  )sv

  z ~wit
= Etf  sv

(1 +  )w z ~wit   sww ~witg:
This implies
 z =
wsw
(1  w)(1 +  ) sv  
:
Proof of Lemma 2
I dene   s 1w (1   ") sv(1 +  ) z, such that equation (41) in the text can be
expressed as w^nashit+s = w^
nash
t+s   (logW it  logWt+s). Inserting this into (39), I obtain
0 = Et
1X
s=0
s(1  )ssw[logW it   logPt+s   logw   w^nasht+s + (logW it   logWt+s)]
= Et
1X
s=0
s(1  )ssw[(1 + ) logW it + w^t+s   w^nasht+s   (1 + ) logWt+s)]:
Notice that all renegotiating rms will agree on the same nominal wage, logW it =
logW t . Solving for logW

t yields
(1+) logW t = [1  (1 )w]Et
1X
s=0
s(1 )ssw[w^nasht+s   w^t+s+(1+) logWt+s]:
(A5)
Equation (A5) admits the following representation,
(1 + ) logW t = [1  (1  )w][w^nasht   w^t + (1 + ) logWt]
+(1  )wEt(1 + ) logW t+1;
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or alternatively
(1 + )(logW t   logWt) = [1  (1  )w](w^nasht   w^t) (A6)
+(1  )wEt(1 + )(logW t+1   logWt):
The law of motion of the wage index, equation (30) in the text, can be approximated
by
logW t   logWt =
w
1  w (logWt   logWt 1) =
w
1  wwt:
Using this, equation (A6) can be expressed as
(1 + )
w
1  wwt = [1  (1  )w](w^
nash
t   w^t) (A7)
+(1  ) w
1  wEt(1 + )wt+1:
Dividing (A7) by (1 + ) w
1 w , I nally obtain equation (42) in the text.
Proof of Lemma 3
Log-linearizing the worker surplus, equation (27) for any i, I obtain
Swy S^
w
it = sww^it   sw¯ bw¯ t + (1  )Swy Et[^t;t+1 + wS^w0it+1 + (1  w)S^wt+1]; (A8)
where Swy  nS
w
y
is total worker surplus as a fraction of GDP. I now make the
following guess,
S^wit = S^
w
t + w ~wit; (A9)
For non-renegotiating rms, I can then write
S^w0it = S^
w0
t + w ~wit 1; (A10)
where S^w0t is the average worker surplus across non-renegotiating rms. Using (A10)
as well as w^it = ~wit + w^t in (A8), I can write
Swy S^
w
it = sw( ~wit + w^t)  sw¯ bw¯ t (A11)
+(1  )Swy Et[^t;t+1 + w(S^w0t+1 + w ~wit) + (1  w)S^wt+1]:
I now average (A11) across all rms and substract the resulting expression from
(A11). This, combined with (A9), yields
Swy (S^
w
it   S^wt ) = Swy w ~wit = sw ~wit + (1  )Swy ww ~wit;
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which implies
w =
sw
[1  (1  )w]Swy
:
Similarly, log-linearization of the rm surplus, equation (26) for any i, yields
Sfy S^
f
it = s wbwit   sww^it + (1  )SfyEt[^t;t+1 + wS^f0it+1 + (1  w)S^ft+1]; (A12)
where Sfy  nS
f
y
. I now guess
S^fit = S^
f
t    f ~wit: (A13)
This implies that, for non-renegotiating rms,
S^f0it = S^
f0
t    f ~wit 1; (A14)
where S^f0t is the average rm surplus across non-renegotiating rms. From the
denition of wit, equation (19), it follows that, up a log-linear approximation,
swbwit = swbwt +  sv(1 +  )~zit (A15)
= swbwt    sv(1 +  ) z ~wit
where in the second equality I have used Lemma 1. Using (A14), (A15) and w^it =
~wit + w^t in (A12), I obtain
Sfy S^
f
it = s wbwt    sv(1 +  ) z ~wit   sw( ~wit + w^t) (A16)
+(1  )SfyEt[^t;t+1 + w(S^f0t+1    f ~wit) + (1  w)S^ft+1]:
Again, I average (A16) across all rms and substract the resulting expression from
(A16). This, combined with (A13), yields
Sfy (S^
f
it   S^ft ) =  Sfy  f ~wit =   sv(1 +  ) z ~wit   sw ~wit   (1  )Sfy w f ~wit;
which implies
 f =
sw +  sv(1 +  ) z
[1  (1  )w]Sfy
:
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Proof of Lemma 4
Using Lemma 3, I can express the worker surplus in renegotiating rms in period
t+ 1 as
S^wt+1 = S^
w
t+1 + wEt(logW

t+1   logWt+1):
Similarly for the rm surplus in renegotiating rms,
S^ft+1 = S^
f
t+1    fEt(logW t+1   logWt+1):
From the bargaining rule, equation (28) in the text, I have S^wt+1 = S^
f
t+1, which implies
S^wt+1 = S^
f
t+1   ( f + w)(logW t+1   logWt+1): (A17)
Log-linearizing the rst order condition with respect to vacancies, equation (6), and
using Lemmas 1 and 3 to aggregate across rms yields
Et(^t;t+1 + S^
f
t+1) = '^t + (1  )^t +  z^t: (A18)
Combining (A17) and (A18), I obtain
Et(^t;t+1 + S^
w
t+1) = Et(^t;t+1 + S^
f
t+1)  ( f + w)Et(logW t+1   logWt+1)(A19)
= '^t + (1  )^t +  z^t   ( f + w)
w
1  wEtwt+1;
where in the second equality I have used logW t+1   logWt+1 = w1 wwt+1.
Averaging the individual Nash wage, equation (40), and using (A19), I obtain
sww^
nash
t = (1  ")[dmplt +  sv(1 +  )z^t + (+  sv)'^t] + h^t
+"
1 + ~b
1 + 
 1c^t + "pSwy

^t + '^t +  z^t   Etwt+1

;
where   ( f + w) w1 w . Using the fact that, in the steady state, Swy = 1 "" Sfy
and Sfy = (1 +  )
sv

, I nally obtain equation (43) in the text.
B. Deriving the loss function
Following the method pioneered by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and extensively
analyzed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 6), I now nd a second-order approximation of the
welfare criterion,
1X
t=0
tUt;
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where the period utility ow is given by
Ut  u(ct)  nt [v(ht) + b] :
I assume u(ct) = c1 
 1
t =(1    1) and v(ht) = h1+t =(1 + ). Notice that we can
express any function xat as e
a lnxt. We can then expand every function in the loga-
rithm of its arguments around their steady-state levels, lnx. This way, I obtain the
following approximation of u(ct),
u(ct) = u(c)(1   1)(c^t + 1  
 1
2
c^2t ) + t:i:p:+O
3 (B1)
= u0(c)y(scc^t +
1   1
2
scc^
2
t ) + t:i:p:+O
3;
where Ok indicates terms of order k-th and higher in the size of the shocks and
t:i:p: represents terms independent of policy. In the second equality I have used
u(c)(1   1) = u0(c)c and c = scy. Similarly, I make the following approximation
ntv(ht) = nv(h)[(1 + )(h^t +
1 + 
2
h^2t ) + n^t +
1
2
n^2t + (1 + )h^tn^t] + t:i:p:+O
3(B2)
= u0(c)y[(h^t +
1 + 
2
h^2t ) +

1 + 
(n^t +
1
2
n^2t ) + h^tn^t] + t:i:p:+O
3;
were in the second equality I have used the fact that v(h) = v
0(h)h
1+
, my assumption
of e¢ cient steady state hours, v0(h) = u0(c)mpl, as well as mpl =  y
nh
. The term ntb
can be approximated by
ntb = nv(h)~b(n^t +
1
2
n^2t ) + t:i:p:+O
3 (B3)
= u0(c)y
~b
1 + 
(n^t +
1
2
n^2t ) + t:i:p:+O
3;
where ~b  b
v(h)
.
Combining (B1), (B2) and (B3), the ow utility of the household can be approx-
imated by
Ut = u
0(c)yfscc^t   h^t    1 +
~b
1 + 
n^t +
1
2
[(1   1)scc^2t (B4)
  1 +
~b
1 + 
n^2t   (1 + )h^2t   2h^tn^t]g+ t:i:p:+O3:
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The aggregate resource constraint
In order to eliminate the linear terms in c^t and h^t in equation (B4), I need to ap-
proximate the aggregate resource constraint. Individual hiring costs can be written
as

1 +  
z1+ it nit = hc

(1 +  )z^it + n^it +
1
2
[(1 +  )2z^2it + n^
2
it + 2(1 +  )z^itn^it]

+t:i:p:+O3;
(B5)
where hc  
1+ 
z1+ n is hiring costs in the steady state. Total employment nt R
nitdi and the average hiring rate zt 
R
nit
nt
zitdi can be approximated, respectively,
by
n^t = Ein^it +
1
2
V arin^it +O
3; (B6)
z^t = Eiz^it +
1
2
V ariz^it + Ein^itz^it   n^tz^t +O3; (B7)
where for any variable eit, Eieit 
R 1
0
eitdi and V arieit  Ei(eit   Eieit)2 denote
its cross-sectional average and variance, respectively. I have also used the identity
Ein^
2
it = V arin^it + (Ein^it)
2 and the fact that n^2t = (Ein^it)
2 + O3 (and similarly for
z^t). On the other hand, the average hiring rate can also be written as zt = vtnt , which
allows me to write z^t = v^t  n^t. Combining this with equations (B5), (B6) and (B7),
I can write total hiring costs asZ 1
0

1 +  
z^1+ it n^itdi = hcf(1 +  )v^t    n^t +
1
2
[((1 +  )v^t    n^t)2 (B8)
+ (1 +  )V ariz^it]g+ t:i:p:+O3:
Using (B8), the aggregate resource constraint, Atf(htnt; k) =
R

1+ 

vit
nit
1+ 
nitdi+
ctt, admits the following approximation,
scc^t   h^t = at + (+ sv )n^t   sv(1 +  )v^t   sc^t + 1
2
f[at + (n^t + h^t)]2(B9)
 scc^2t   sv[((1 +  )v^t    n^t)2 +  (1 +  )V ariz^it]g+O3:
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Notice that ^2t does not appear in (B9): as I show below, ^t is already a second
order term. Inserting (B9) in (B4), I obtain
Ut = u
0(c)yf(  
~b
1 + 
+ sv )n^t   sv(1 +  )v^t   sc^t (B10)
+
1
2
[(at + (n^t + h^t))
2    1scc^2t   
1 + ~b
1 + 
n^2t   (1 + )h^2t   2h^tn^t
 sv[((1 +  )v^t    n^t)2 +  (1 +  )V ariz^it]]g+ t:i:p:+O3:
The Beveridge curve
In order to eliminate the remaining linear terms in (B10), I perform the following
second order approximation of the Beveridge curve, nt+1 = (1  )nt + vtu1 t ,
n^t+1+
n^2t+1
2
= (1 )(n^t+ n^
2
t
2
)+

v^t + (1  )u^t + 1
2
[v^t + (1  )u^t]2

+O3; (B11)
where I have used the fact that m
n
= . On the other hand, the unemployment rate,
ut = 1  nt, admits the following approximation
u^t =  p

(n^t +
n^2t
2
)  u^
2
t
2
+O3; (B12)
where I have used the steady-state Beveridge curve, n
u
= p

. Inserting (B12) into
(B11), multiplying both sides by t and integrating across t, I obtain
1X
t=0
tf[ 1   (1    (1  )p)]n^t   v^tg (B13)
=
1X
t=0
t
1
2
f[v^t + (1  )u^t]2   (1  )u^2t   [ 1   (1    (1  )p)]n^2tg
+O3 + t:i:p:;
where I have used the fact that n^0 is independent of policy as of time 0. From the job
creation condition in the steady state, equation (51), I have  1  [1   (1  )p] =
1
1+ 
s 1v (
 ~b
1+
+  sv). This allows me to rewrite (B13) as
1X
t=0
t
"
(
   ~b
1 + 
+  sv)n^t   (1 +  )svv^t
#
(B14)
=
1X
t=0
t
1
2
f(1 +  )sv[v^2t   (1  )u^2t + 2(1  )v^tu^t]  (
   ~b
1 + 
+  sv)n^
2
tg+O3 + t:i:p:;
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I now multiply (B10) by t and integrate across t. I can then insert (B14) in the
resulting expression to obtain
1X
t=0
tUt =
u0(c)y
2
1X
t=0
tf[at + (n^t + h^t)]2    1scc^2t   n^2t   (1 + )h^2t (B15)
 2h^tn^t   (1 +  )sv[(1  )^2t +  z^2t +  V ariz^it]  2sc^tg+ t:i:p:+O3;
where I have used the fact that ^t = v^t   u^t.
Price dispersion and ination
A second order Taylor expansion of t =
R 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
) dj yields
^t +
^2t
2
=  (Ej ~pjt   
2
Ej ~p
2
jt) +O
3; (B16)
where ~pjt  log(Pjt=Pt) and I have used the fact that ss = 1. Similarly, a second
order approximation of P 1 t =
R 1
0
Pjt
1 dj, or 1 =
R 1
0
(
Pjt
Pt
)1 dj, yields
Ej ~pjt =
   1
2
Ej ~p
2
jt +O
3:
Therefore, (B16) becomes
^t =

2
Ej ~p
2
jt +O
3; (B17)
where I have used the fact that ^2t is O
4.
A rst order approximation of equation (12) in the text yields
logP t   logPt =
p
1  pt +O
2;
where t  log(Pt=Pt 1) is the ination rate. I now nd an expression for Ej ~p2jt,
Ej ~p
2
jt =
Z p
0
(logPjt 1   logPt)2dj +
Z 1
p
(logP t   logPt)2dj (B18)
= p(
2
t + Ej ~p
2
jt 1) +
2p
1  p
2
t +O
3
= pEj ~p
2
jt 1 +
p
1  p
2
t +O
3
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where in the second equality I have used logPjt 1   logPt = ~pjt 1   t, the fact
that non-price-setters are randomly chosen, as well as the fact that tEj ~pjt = O3.
Multiplying both sides of (B18) by 
2
and using (B17), I can write the following law
of motion for the price dispersion term,
^t = p^t 1 +

2
p
1  p
2
t +O
3: (B19)
Multiplying (B19) by t, integrating forward and using the fact that ^ 1 is inde-
pendent of policy as of time 0, I obtain
1X
t=0
t^t =

2
p
(1  p)(1  p)
1X
t=0
t2t + t:i:p:+O
3 (B20)
Dispersion in hiring rates and wage ination
Following Proposition 6.3 in Woodford (2003), we know that, when wages are reset
at random intervals in a Calvo (1983) fashion, the cross-sectional variance of wages
is related to wage ination in the following way,
V ari logWit  wt = wwt 1 + w
1  w
2
wt +O
3: (B21)
Multiplying (B21) by t, integrating forward and using the fact that w; 1 is inde-
pendent of policy as of time 0, I obtain
1X
t=0
twt =
w
(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0
t2wt + t:i:p:+O
3
Given that ~zit =   z ~wit, it follows that V ariz^it =  2zV ari logWit. This allows me to
write 1X
t=0
tV ariz^it =
 2zw
(1  w)(1  w)
1X
t=0
t2wt + t:i:p:+O
3: (B22)
Finally, inserting (B20) and (B22) into (B15) yields
1X
t=0
tUt =  u
0(c)y
2
1X
t=0
tfp2t + w2wt +  1scc^2t   [at + (n^t + h^t)]2 + n^2t
+(1 + )h^2t + 2h^tn^t + (1 +  )sv[(1  )^
2
t +  z^
2
t ]g+ t:i:p:+O3;
where p  sc p , p 
(1 p)(1 p)
p
and w  (1 +  )sv 2zw(1 w)(1 w) .
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Figure 1: Response to a negative productivity shock, under the optimal and the zero
ination policy
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Figure 2: Response to a negative productivity shock in the social planner allocation
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Figure 3: Unemployment response, net of response in the social planner allocation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
months
%
optimal
zero inflation
56
Figure 4: Net expected welfare loss under alternative policies
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Figure 5: The bargaining set in rms that last changed the nominal wage 52 months
ago, optimal policy
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Figure 6: The bargaining set in rms that last changed the nominal wage 52 months
ago, zero ination policy
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Figure 7: Net expected welfare loss under a lagged wage norm
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Figure 8: Net expected welfare loss under a constant wage norm
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